Natural Justice is a bold attempt to lay the foundations for a genuine science of morals using the theory of games. Since human morality is no less a product of evolution than any other human characteristic, the book takes the view that we need to explore its origins in the food-sharing social contracts of our prehuman ancestors. It is argued that the deep structure of our current fairness norms continues to reflect the logic of these primeval social contracts, but (...) the particular fairness norm a society operates is largely a product of cultural evolution. In pursuing this point, the book proposes a naturalistic reinterpretation of John Rawls' original position that reconciles his egalitarian theory of justice with John Harsanyi's utilitarian theory by identifying the environment appropriate to each. (shrink)

The following responses to the scholars who were kind enough to comment on my Natural Justice in this symposium have been kept to a minimum by addressing only issues where I think a misunderstanding may have arisen.

What makes the law the Law? Are the rules set by society based on immutable truths and forms of nature, or are they more like an evolving draft of guidelines for human conduct? Is the law the product of disinterested reason, or do the critical legal theorists have a point when they trace the shape of the law to the centers of power in our society? With Mark Tushnet, Andy Altman, and Jude Dougherty.

My article concerns constitutional interpretation and substantive due process, issues that played a central role in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), one of the two same-sex marriage cases. (The other same-sex marriage case was United States v. Windsor (2013).) -/- The late Justice Scalia consistently maintained that the Court “invented” substantive due process and continues to apply this legal “fiction” not because the Constitution supports it but simply because the justices like it. Two theories underlay his cynical conclusion. First is (...) the theory of “Constitutional Textualism”—or just plain “Textualism”—which says that the meaning of the Constitution lies entirely within the “four corners” of the document. Second is the theory of “Originalism,” which says that this meaning was fixed at the time of ratification. (Likewise, the meanings of the amendments were fixed at the time of their ratification.) -/- While Justice Scalia helped to inspire a Textualist/Originalist (and anti-substantive-due-process) movement, his Originalism has received far more attention than his Textualism. Since Judge Robert Bork first introduced Originalism to the general public during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987, this theory has ignited passions on all sides and effectively re-framed the entire debate about how to interpret the Constitution. Constitutional scholars, left and right, now define themselves as either for or against Originalism. Meanwhile, Textualism has merely retreated into the background. -/- Part of the reason for this disparate treatment is that many who reject Originalism still consider themselves to be Textualists. They agree with Justice Scalia (and Judge Bork) that the text is all-important. They disagree, however, that its meaning was fixed for eternity at ratification. Instead, they maintain that either the meaning of the text or applications of this meaning to new cases can change as society changes. -/- In this Article, I bring Textualism out of Originalism’s shadow and into broad daylight. I argue that once we dig just a little deeper into the proposition that all of the meaning in the Constitution inheres in its words, we find that this theory simply cannot work. In order to interpret the nation’s foundational document, we must resort to assumptions that it does not explicitly state. (Indeed, even Textualism itself is a theory that the Constitution does not explicitly endorse.) And the notion that “extra-textual” assumptions necessarily inform our interpretations of the Constitution poses a direct and insurmountable threat to Textualism. -/- The Constitution actually requires each judge, when faced with a case concerning the right to privacy, not merely to consider the text but also to anticipate and evaluate the moral, social, and political consequences of both possible decisions before choosing between them. While this position may initially sound counterintuitive, it turns out to be a much more realistic theory of constitutional interpretation than Textualism (and Originalism). -/- I ultimately conclude that, contrary to Justice Scalia, the Constitution most certainly does protect a right to privacy. For what it’s worth, the Obergefell majority agree with me (and oppose Justice Scalia). I aim to show exactly why they are correct. (shrink)

This paper summarizes a theory of fairness that replaces the metaphysical foundations of the egalitarian theory of John Rawls and the utilitarian theory of John Harsanyi with evolutionary arguments. As such, it represents an attempt to realize John Mackie’s call for a theory based on the data provided by anthroplogists and the propositions proved by game theorists. The basic claim is that fairness norms evolved as a device for selecting one of the infinity of efficient equilibria of the repeated game (...) of life played by our prehuman ancestors. (shrink)

Among other things, Baumard et al.'s considers the enforcement and establishment of moral norms, the interpersonal comparison of welfare, and the structure of fairness norms. This commentary draws attention to the relevance of the game theory literature to the first and second topic, and the social psychology literature to the third topic.

If some external enforcement agency compels us to honor deals reached in the original position, then Harsanyi has shown that the outcome will be utilitarian. Under the same hypotheses, Rawls claims that the outcome will be egalitarian. This chapter confirms that Harsanyi is correct. It goes on to use the concept of an empathy equilibrium to predict the standard of interpersonal comparison needed to operate a utilitarian norm that will evolve in the medium run.

What makes the law the Law? Are the rules set by society based on immutable truths and forms of nature, or are they more like an evolving draft of guidelines for human conduct? Is the law the product of disinterested reason, or do the critical legal theorists have a point when they trace the shape of the law to the centers of power in our society? With Mark Tushnet, Andy Altman, and Jude Dougherty.

Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...) -/- This Article will argue for three points. First, what fuels this kind of outrage is vengeance: the desire to see defendants like George Zimmerman be forced to “pay” for the harms that they needlessly and culpably inflict on others. While this point may seem obvious, it isn’t. Most people repudiate revenge and therefore the notion that it plays any role in the criminal justice system. -/- Second, this attitude toward revenge is misguided and needs to change. We need to recognize that vengeance not only does but should play a significant role in motivating criminal punishment. Our vengeful reactions to harmful crimes are not ugly or shameful; on the contrary, they manifest a deep valuation of victims and a bitter denunciation of individuals who actively renounce this valuation through their criminal behavior. -/- Third, these two points have significant implications for the two main theories of criminal punishment: “retributivism,” which says that criminals should be punished in order to give them their “just deserts,” and “consequentialism,” which says that criminals should be punished in order to bring about such good consequences as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Traditionally, these two theories have been at war with one another. But I will show how recognizing revenge as a motivation and justification for punishment can help to end this war and bring these two theories together. (shrink)

Who gets to use force and when? How are we supposed to justify the use of violence in achieving political goals and establishing and maintaining political communities and structures? With Anthony Ellis , David Garren , and Scott Hibbard.

In this essay Ken McGrew critically examines the school-to-prison pipeline metaphor and associated literature. The origins and influence of the metaphor are compared with the origins and influence of the competing prison industrial complex concept. Specific weaknesses in the pipeline literature are examined. These problems are described as resulting, in part, from the influence that the pipeline metaphor has on the thinking of those who follow it. McGrew argues that addressing the weaknesses in the literature, abandoning the metaphor, and adopting (...) a more complex theoretical orientation grounded in critical scholarship, will enable educational scholars to better capture the relational nature of the social phenomena being described while simultaneously making their work more useful to emerging movements for social justice. (shrink)

I argue for three conclusions. First, responsibility skeptics are committed to the position that the criminal justice system should adopt a universal nonresponsibility excuse. Second, a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some of our most deeply held values, further dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater number of innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. Third, while Saul Smilansky's ‘illusionist’ response to responsibility skeptics – that even if responsibility skepticism is correct, society should maintain a responsibility‐realist/retributivist criminal (...) justice system – is generally compelling, it would not work if a majority of society were to convert, theoretically and psychologically, to responsibility skepticism. In this (highly improbable) scenario, and only in this (highly improbable) scenario, the criminal justice system would need to be reformed in such a way that it aligned with the majority's responsibility‐skeptical beliefs and attitudes. (shrink)

This short paper begins with a summary of the views of a sympathetic game theorist on the current state of play in what is still called the New Institutional Economics. It continues with a much abbreviated summary of my own attempts to treat justice as a kind of institution in the hope that this will serve as a case study in how game theory can serve as a useful intellectual framework for the study of human institutions.

Faith healing deaths occur infrequently in Canada, but when they do they pose a considerable challenge for criminal justice. Similar to caregivers who absent-mindedly and fatally forget a child in a hot vehicle, faith healers do not intentionally harm their children. It can seem legally excessive and unjust to prosecute achingly bereaved parents. But unlike ‘hot-car’ deaths, faith healing parents are not absent minded in the deaths they cause. Rather, significant deliberation and strength of will is necessary to treat (...) their child’s ailment with faith alone. Two different Criminal Code provisions can be brought to bear upon these deaths, namely, s. 215 ‘Failing to provide the necessaries of life’ and s. 219 ‘Criminal negligence’. From a public, medical, and scientific perspective treating potentially fatal ailments with ‘faith’ and ‘prayer’ seems like reckless endangerment, giving apparent justification to the more serious criminal negligence charge. But, the fault element in the criminal negligence offence continues to be a vexing issue in Canadian jurisprudence. People accused of negligence-based offences are commonly held to the standard of what a reasonable person might predictably have done in similar circumstances. While it is unnecessary for the impartial trier of fact to conceive of faith healing as ‘reasonable’, it is an open question whether faith healers are sufficiently unreasonable to warrant serious criminal condemnation and possible incarceration when their course of action causes death. Is it justifiable to think of faith healers who cause death as criminally unreasonable? That is, do they depart markedly enough from the standard that criminal negligence is rightly attributed to them? Public attitudes toward religion, religious fundamentalism, and healthcare must be considered when trying to discern what a reasonable person does when treating an ailing child at risk of death. (shrink)

At a House hearing on December 5, 2023, the presidents of three universities—Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania—refused to state that certain kinds of hate speech, specifically calls for genocide of Jews, are prohibited on their campuses. The backlash against two of them, Harvard’s Claudine Gay and Penn’s Liz Magill, was swift and devastating; both of them were successfully pressured to resign. Still, while Professors Gay’s and Magill’s responses were widely criticized as tone-deaf, they were legally correct. At many (...) private, and all public, colleges and universities, even the worst hate speech is generally protected unless it is accompanied by aggressive, threatening, or violent conduct. -/- These “demotions” augur even worse consequences, including termination, for less powerful faculty who say the “wrong” thing, in particular statements in support of Trumpism, an increasingly mainstream ideology that stitches together white supremacy, misogyny, a preference for autocracy over democracy, and several phobias—homophobia, Islamophobia, transphobia, and xenophobia. The question I address in this paper is whether these consequences are constitutional at public schools. Whose right is stronger—a public-school teacher’s First Amendment right to express pro-Trumpist sentiments or a public school’s right to maintain a fair, inclusive, and welcoming learning environment? In this article, I argue that the public school has the upper hand here, that it is indeed constitutionally permitted to prohibit political hate speech that contributes to a hostile learning environment. Still, I narrowly limit this prohibition to dehumanizing speech—that is, speech explicitly suggesting that some human beings are “lesser”, intrinsically less valuable, than other human beings. -/- One objection to this position is that public schools may not prohibit any speech, no matter how dehumanizing, because such prohibition amounts to constitutionally impermissible viewpoint discrimination. I argue, however, that viewpoint discrimination is an integral part of education and therefore constitutionally permissible. Education necessarily involves promoting some values over others. These values fall into seven categories: constitutional principles, the humanist virtues, successful character traits and behaviors, knowledge and truth, art and beauty, health (both mental and physical), and social goods (such as justice, peace, and rule of law). (shrink)

This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games. Key Words: game theory • equilibrium • evolutionary stability • reciprocity • folk theorem • trust • altruism • (...) responsibility • authority. (shrink)

Metaphysical moral theories can be loosely be divided into theories of the Good or Right. Naturalistic theories can be said to be theories of the seemly — what is appropriate in a particular place and time. This chapter explains how rights and duties can fit within a theory of the seemly. You have a right to do something if you do not have a duty not to do it. You have a duty to do something if you would otherwise diverge (...) from equilibrium play in the social contract currently operated by your society. (shrink)

This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is taken to be the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate. Such social contracts are seen as the product of biological and cultural evolution. To survive, a social contract must therefore be an equilibrium in the repeated game of (...) life played by a society. Since the folk theorem of repeated game theory says that there are large numbers of such equilibria, fairness norms then become explicable as an equilibrium selection device that selects one of the many efficient equilibria of a society's game of life. It is suggested that the deep structure of such fairness norms is captured by John Rawls' notion of the original position, and is therefore universal in the human species. On the other hand, the standard of interpersonal comparison needed as an input to the original position is culturally determined. (shrink)

This invited entry offers a brief overview of criminal responsibility. -/- The first part starts with a question: is Clyde criminally responsible for killing his girlfriend Bonnie? The answer: it depends. Particular circumstances determine whether Clyde is guilty of murder, guilty of manslaughter, not guilty because he has a good excuse, or not guilty because he has a good justification. -/- The second part addresses the complicated relationship between criminal responsibility and moral responsibility. Until recently, both concepts were considered to (...) be more or less interchangeable. But there is a growing movement, which I refer to as "responsibility skepticism," which maintains that moral responsibility is either physically or metaphysically impossible. If the responsibility skeptics are right (that moral responsibility is impossible), then what are the implications for criminal responsibility and just criminal punishment? Should we abandon these as well? Or can they survive without moral responsibility? I try to answer these questions. -/- The third part addresses social causation. The criminal justice system tends to be "dispositionalist"; it tends, that is, to assume that criminal responsibility resides entirely within the defendant. Dispositionalism, however, overlooks the fact that who we are and what we do are significantly determined by environmental influences. I then try to show that this "situationist" alternative to dispositionalism should not radically alter our approach to criminal punishment. -/- The final part briefly discusses the difficulty in evaluating criminal responsibility when the defendant is both an offender and a victim - especially when the defendant is an offender *because* of his victimization. (shrink)

This essay pairs two prototypically American technological objects of the mid‐twentieth century: the atomic bomb and the lie detector. Although the former has been touted as the supreme achievement of modern technoscience, and the latter dismissed as a placebo device, the two “gadgets” actually performed in analogous fashion. Indeed, the essay suggests that these technologies are best understood not in terms of narrow functionality but in terms of their performance—akin to that of Frankenstein’s monster—in the domains of justice, popular (...) culture, and geopolitics. Specifically, it argues that the mutually supportive roles played by the two objects underscore the ways in which the theater of deterrence sustained American sovereignty during the era of the Cold War. (shrink)

Knowledge was traditionally held to be justified true belief. This paper examines the implications of maintaining this view if justication is interpreted algorithmically. It is argued that if we move sufficiently far from the small worlds to which Bayesian decision theory properly applies, we can steer between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism only by explicitly building into our framing of the underlying decision problem the possibility that its attempt to describe the world is inadequate.

The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution to various other social mysteries. Who guards the guardians? How are authority, blame, courtesy, dignity, envy, friendship, guilt, honor, integrity, justice, loyalty, modesty, ownership, pride, reputation, status, trust, virtue, and the like to be explained as emergent phenomena? How do beliefs that many people privately know to be false (...) survive? (shrink)

Suppose you are at the gym trying to see some naked beauties by peeping through a hole in the wall. A policeman happens by, he asks you what you are doing, and you honestly tell him. He then arrests you for voyeurism. Are you guilty? We don’t know yet because there is one more fact to be considered: while you honestly thought that a locker room was on the other side of the wall, it was actually a squash court. Are (...) you guilty now? -/- Probably. You might argue that your scopophiliac ambition was impossible to satisfy given that you were peeping into a squash court, not a locker room. But this “Impossibility Defense” would fail because most jurisdictions follow the very influential Model Penal Code (MPC), which says that what is important about attempt is not the likelihood of success but rather what was going on in your head. You tried to peer into a locker room with the intention of seeing some nudity; that is enough for culpability. The fact that you were mistaken about the location does not exonerate you. -/- But now suppose that the particular jurisdiction you are in does not criminalize voyeurism. While most people think that voyeurism is just plain wrong, if not disgusting, the legislature just never got around to drafting a statute against it. Are you guilty now? The answer is no. But you might just be out of luck and convicted anyway. -/- The reason for this strange conclusion is that most jurisdictions have followed the Model Penal Code in yet another respect: along with the MPC’s “subjectivist” emphasis on what is in your head, they have followed the MPC’s lead in abolishing the Impossibility Defense entirely. As a result, people who believe that they are breaking laws when they really are not may still be subject to arrest, prosecution, and conviction respectively by police, prosecutors, and judges/juries merely if all three parties regard your conduct — especially your trying to violate a law that you mistakenly believed in — as morally reprehensible. The best, if not only, defense against this charge is the Impossibility Defense, but — again — most jurisdictions have decided to make this defense unavailable to defendants. -/- Depriving eligible defendants of the Impossibility Defense is unjust. It violates one of the most basic principles of criminal justice: the legality principle. The legality principle says that there cannot be just punishment without a crime, and there should not be a crime without an explicit law designating it as such. So you cannot be charged with, and convicted of, attempted voyeurism if voyeurism, reprehensible as it may be, was not explicitly prohibited at the time that you made the attempt. -/- If we believe in the legality principle, then we must restore the Impossibility Defense. Without the latter, too many defendants are being — and will continue to be — punished for attempts to perform acts that were not themselves illegal but which various parties in the criminal justice system (except the legislature) thought should be illegal based on their extralegal, moral prejudices. -/- In addition to the MPC, the principal obstacle to resurrecting the Impossibility Defense is a good deal of conceptual confusion that permeates relevant cases and scholarship. Too many courts and academics have conflated “factual impossibility” with “legal impossibility” and have fallaciously inferred “hybrid impossibility” from “hybrid mistakes” (that is, legal mistakes that derive from factual mistakes). One of the principal goals of this Article, then, is to clear up all of this confusion. I will explicate in the simplest possible terms (a) the difference between factual impossibility and legal impossibility, (b) why only legal impossibility qualifies as exculpatory, and (c) why hybrid impossibility simply does not exist. (shrink)

The central theme and core objective of this comprehensive resource for elementary teachers on climate change and children’s emotions and resiliency is supporting children’s understanding of and respect for the interconnectedness all life: human, animal, plant, and clean air, water, and soil. Its broad social/cultural perspective emphasizes that social and ecological justice are interrelated. Challenging elementary teachers to more explicitly address current environmental issues with students in their classrooms, the book presents a diverse set of topics from a variety (...) of perspectives. Coverage includes descriptions of environmental education pedagogies such as nature-based experiences and place-based studies; peace-education practices; children doing environmental activism; and teachers supporting children emotionally in times of climate disruption and tumult. The pedagogies described invite student engagement and action in the public sphere. Children are represented as ‘agents of change’ engaged in social and environmental issues and problems through their actions both local and global. (shrink)

Is racism an act of the will? A disease? A bad habit? A result of lost virtues or of historical economic forces? Can we reliably claim that racism is an affront to justice? How does our scientific understanding of "race" affect our ethical considerations ? How can we ever know if we are acting from racist assumptions? With Leonard Harris, Naomi Zack, and Hugh Taft-Morales.

This chapter surveys the relevant bargaining theory, namely the Nash bargaining solution, the utilitarian bargaining solution, and the egalitarian bargaining solution. The importance of how interpersonal comparisons of utility are made is emphasized.

This chapter reviews the calumnies that are commonly directed at moral naturalists. Philosophical rationalism is compared unfavorably with the empirical tradition by drawing attention to the inadequacies in the reasoning that supposedly leads to Kant's categorical imperative. Moral naturalism is defended on the same basis as biological naturalism. Moral relativism — the big no-no for metaphysical moralists — is defended against a variety of common criticisms; reductionism gets the same treatment. Finally, the life of David Hume is advanced as a (...) counter-example to those who feel that naturalism is necessarily dehumanizing or dispiriting. (shrink)

After demolishing metaphysical notions of moral behavior, John Mackie's Inventing Right and Wrong argues that the way forward is through the study of anthropology and game theory. This chapter begins a review of the basic ideas of game theory by explaining both the rational and the evolutionary interpretation of Nash equilibria in various games, including the Prisoners' Dilemma, the Stag Hunt Game, the Ultimatum Game, the Centipede Game, and the Nash Demand Game.

Sympathy refers to caring about another to some degree as one cares for oneself. Empathy refers to the capacity to put yourself in the position of others to see things from their point of view. Empathetic preferences compare being one person in one situation with being another person in another situation. John Harsanyi showed that mild assumptions imply that to have empathetic preferences is the same thing as having rates at which the utility units of different people are to be (...) traded off against one another. A consequence is that empathetic preferences have the same structure as Hamilton's rule, and so may have originated from strangers adopted into a clan being treated as surrogate kinfolk. But since empathetic preferences are cultural artifacts, they are subject to cultural evolution. The idea of an empathy equilibrium is introduced to capture the medium-run effects of such cultural evolution on empathetic preferences. (shrink)

This chapter explores the consequence of taking Rawls' concerns about the strains of commitment to their logical extreme. If there is no external enforcement at all, so that all agreements must be self-policing, it is shown that deals reached in the original position will generate an egalitarian outcome, as Rawls would wish. The conclusions are broadly consistent with the class of laboratory results that psychologists refer to as “modern equity theory”. The concept of an empathy equilibrium is used to predict (...) the standard of interpersonal comparison needed to operate an egalitarian norm that will evolve in the medium run. The manner in which this standard should be expected to respond to need, effort, ability, and status is then explored. (shrink)

When do we care for others as we care for ourselves? William Hamilton showed that we should be expected to care for our family members in proportion to our degree of relationship to them. Such reasoning explains why eusociality evolved independently at least twelve times in the order Hymenoptera, which includes ants, bees, and wasps, but only three times elsewhere in the animal kingdom. It also verifies Thomas Hobbes' answer to the question: Why cannot mankind live sociably one with another (...) as bees or ants? (shrink)

This chapter looks to the broad consequences of the theory of fairness advanced in this book to questions of social reform. The traditional spectrum of political attitudes that ranges from the utilitarian left to the libertarian right is rejected in favor of a more realistic opposition between the neofeudal societies in which we currently live, and the prospect of fairer and freer societies that could be created by a planned program of decentralization which is identified with the whiggery that inspired (...) the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Declaration of Independence of 1776. The contribution that game theory can make to such a program is briefly reviewed along with the deficiencies of the current theory. (shrink)

This chapter reviews the relevant anthropology, starting with the apparent universality of the golden rule — do as you would be done by — in hunter-gatherer societies. It points out that all pure foraging societies have two properties: they do not tolerate bosses, and they share very fairly. A putative explanation of the first property is offered that appeals to the game theory discipline of mechanism design. The second property is explained as an evolutionary consequence of the implicit insurance contracts (...) that are common in animals as ahedge against hunger and starvation. If so, then we have an argument in support of the contention that Rawls' original position captures the deep structure of fairness norms wired into our brains. The analogy with Chomsky's deep structure of language is close. (shrink)

There has been a growing debate about the ethics of management buy-outs (MBOs). One possible criticism of the MBO is that it serves the interests of incumbent management at the expense of shareholders. In this paper we develop the general arguments concerning the ethical aspects of the MBO to include other forms of buy-out beyond going privates and apply the analysis to MBOs as a mode of privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). MBOs are justified in this context postperestroika (...) as a means of incentivising economic activity by giving managers an ownership stake in former state enterprises. The actual mode of privatisation, though, raises issues of social justice and the criticism that MBOs are at the expense of the broader social good. The ethical problem for the CEE is to balance the economic gains of a move to markets with the ethical risks to the agents of these markets. (shrink)

Is racism an act of the will? A disease? A bad habit? A result of lost virtues or of historical economic forces? Can we reliably claim that racism is an affront to justice? How does our scientific understanding of "race" affect our ethical considerations? How can we ever know if we are acting from racist assumptions? With Leonard Harris, Naomi Zack, and Hugh Taft-Morales.

The average age of women nursing students in Australia is rising. With this comes the likelihood that more now begin university with family responsibilities, and with their lives structured by the roles of mother and partner. Women with more traditionally gendered ideas of these roles, such as nurturing others and self‐sacrifice, are known to be attracted to nursing as a profession; once at university, however, these students can be vulnerable to gender role stress from the competing demands of study. A (...) qualitative research design, guided by Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy, explored the gendered behaviours and experiences of 22 women nursing students, all of whom had children and began university in a heterosexual intimate relationship. The findings reveal traditional ideas of gender were almost universal among participants, and these ideas had a significant influence on the nursing degree experience. Participants commonly prioritised family over the university and practiced maternal gatekeeping (prevention of male partner involvement in domestic work). These traditionally gendered behaviours, coupled with experiences of gender role stress, had a detrimental impact on participants' capacity to study and their personal wellbeing. The importance of these findings to the burgeoning nursing workforce shortage nursing is considered in terms of student retention and the supply of graduates into the profession. The implications to the nursing profession are also explored against the evidence that nursing students with traditional gender beliefs are less likely to develop as autonomous, critical thinking nurses compared to their gender‐egalitarian peers. The introduction of gender theory via critical pedagogy in the undergraduate nursing degree curriculum is recommended to enlighten and empower women nursing students and promote the competence, agility, and sustainability of the nursing profession. (shrink)

There is at present a divide in the geographical literature between those interested in distributive justice as a social value and those who seek to implement distributive plans on the basis of efficiency of resource use. The former are 'social geographers' interested in equity as a social value, and the latter are 'practical' economic and locational geographers. This divide mirrors one existing elsewhere in social science between Rawlsian liberalism and utilitarian planners. Here we argue that equality and efficiency are (...) related values that cannot be separated easily in the analysis of practical problems. Data on the distribution of transplantable human organs are considered in a practical consideration of this approach. The case-study suggests that inequality of distribution appears to effect adversely the general organ supply. Stated positively, the data suggest that, to the extent that equality of service is an objective, that goal may positively impact on organ supply. More generally, the conclusion argues for a conjoining of theoretical and practical geographical approaches where a scarce resource must be allocated across a dispersed population. (shrink)

DNA samples on the England and Wales national database matching those found at scenes of serious violent or sexual crimes were identified. The earlier offence leading the sample to appear on the database was noted. The bulk involved theft, drug or other offending. The result, indicating offender versatility, is consistent with most research on criminal careers. Its importance for operational police lies in identifying the contribution made by DNA samples taken after less serious offences in clearing subsequent serious crime, and (...) the importance of taking such samples from as wide a list of apparently ‘trivial’ crime types as possible. Examining specific relationships between early and later offences revealed a significant link between providing a DNA sample following a drug offence and subsequently committing murder. (shrink)

I raise a few questions about key points in the argument of Natural Justice. 1. The pivotal role assigned to the theory of indefinitely repeated games appears to be both implausible and unnecessary. 2. The evolutionary foundations of the Nash bargaining solution are not completely secure, and its role in the account of interpersonal comparisons of utility is questionable. 3. Free renegotiation behind the veil of ignorance appears neither to have an evolutionary rationale nor to be a brute fact (...) about the way men are. (shrink)

This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it ensures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that hunter-gatherer societies which survived into the 20th century shared on a very egalitarian basis. What can such information tell us about the sense of fairness with which modern man is born? Using game theory as a basic tool, the book argues that fairness norms should be seen as a device for selecting (...) an efficient equilibrium in the human game of life. Evolutionary arguments are then used to argue that the deep structure of this device resembles the original position formulated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice. Such an evolutionary framework allows problems over welfare comparison and norm enforcement to be tackled in a manner that resolves the long debate between utilitarianism and egalitarianism. (shrink)

This article sets out and comments on the arguments of Binmore 's Natural Justice, and specifically on the empirical hypotheses that underpin his social contract view of the foundations of justice. It argues that Binmore 's dependence on the hypothesis that individuals have purely self-regarding preferences forces him to claim that mutual monitoring of free-riding behavior was sufficiently reliable to enforce cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies, and that this makes it hard to explain why intuitions about justice could (...) have evolved, since in such a society intuitions about justice would have had no adaptive advantage. I argue that it is empirically plausible that human beings display systematic other-regarding preferences. These could be incorporated into Binmore 's general framework in a way that would enrich it and make it more useful for solving practical problems about justice. Key Words: natural justice • fairness • norms • evolution • self-regarding preferences • Rawls • social contract. (shrink)